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NOTE - SECTIONS 2(D) AND 2 (E) OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT-
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RELATED PROVISIONS
I. Introduction
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act were enacted as part
of the overall congressional plan to eliminate price discrimination in any form.'
The two sections specifically prohibit discrimination in payments for promo-
tional2 services and in the rendering of promotional services and/or facilities
by a supplier to a favored customer or customers. The sections are as follows:
2(d):
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay
or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a
customer of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation
or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through such
customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale or offering for
sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for
sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available on
proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distri-
bution of such products or commodities.3
and 2(e):
That it shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of
one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity
bought for resale, with or without processing, by contracting to furnish
or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facili-
ties connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of
such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers
on proportionally equal terms.4
This note hopefully will serve to highlight some of the points made by Messrs.
Kintner and Mezines in the preceding articles, to summarize briefly what every
supplier should know about these sections, and to consider certain problems
caused by the relationship of 2(d) and 2(e) with other antitrust provisions.
1 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 267 F.2d 439,
443 (3d Cir. 1959), summed up the purpose of section 2(d) as follows: "The purpose of the
section here involved was to eliminate all discriminations under the guise of payments for adver-
tising or promotional services, and Congress employed language that would cover any evasive
methods." The court then quoted a statement by Congressman John Utterback, chairman of the
House Judiciary Subcommittee which considered the act prior to its adoption in 1936:
The existing evil at which this part of the bill is aimed is, of course, the grant of
discriminations under the guise of payments for advertising and promotional services
which, whether or not the services are actually rendered as agreed, results in an advan-
tage to the customer so favored as compared with others who have to bear the cost of
such services themselves. The prohibitions of the bill, however, are made intention-
ally broader than this one sphere, in order to prevent evasion in resort to others by
which the same purpose might be accomplished, and it prohibits payment for such
services or facilities, whether furnished "in connection with the processing, handling,
sale, or offering for sale" of the products concerned. 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936).
2 RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 376 (1962):
"T]he legislative purpose and governing judicial rulings confine these provisions to cooperative
promotional arrangements between the supplier and customer in connection with the customer's
resale of the particular product."
3 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964).
4 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1964).
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The wording of section 2(d) differs a great deal from the wording of 2(e)
and this fact alone has been the cause of much confusion and judicial inter-
pretation of almost every word of the two sections.5 The sections differ in that
a 2(d) violation occurs when the buyer performs or obtains the services or facili-
ties and receives payment from the supplier, while, under 2(e), the supplier
himself furnishes the services or facilities to or for the buyer for his use in the
resale of the goods in question.' However, despite the wide variation in the
language of the sections, they do complement each other and are often referred
to as "sister sections." In fact, many of their differing terms have been given
the same meanings. For instance, "customer" in 2(d) and "purchaser" in 2(e)
carry the same meaning; the phrases "competing in the distribution of such
products and commodities" and "engaged in commerce," of 2(d), have been
read into the 2(e) section although they do not appear therein; and, finally,
"available" in 2(d) has been given the same meaning as is "accorded" in 2(e). 7
The concepts of "availability," "on proportionately equal terms," and
"competing customers" have been considered and ably discussed by Mr. Kintner
and Mr. Mezines in their papers and therefore merit further comment, in sum-
mary here, only because of their extreme importance. "Available," as used
in the sections under discussion, means that it is the supplier's duty to make
certain that all competing customers are made aware of any promotional plan
which is offered. This duty is an active and affirmative one and it is therefore
not a good defense to a 2(d) or 2(e) charge for a supplier to say that the plan
was available if only the customer had asked for it. As both Mr. Kintner and
Mr. Mezines point out, a supplier must, in effect, offer the plan, or, in other
words, communicate the fact of its availability to the customer.
No statutory standard exists for "proportionally equal terms." The word
"proportional" naturally prompts the inquiry: "Proportional to what?" Un-
fortunately, Congress has not seen fit to provide a statutory answer to this ques-
tion. Despite the lack of a standard in the statute, the FTC and case law
indicate, as Mr. Mezines points out, that the wisest course for a supplier to take
is to make his promotional allowances, services and/or facilities available to
all customers in proportion to the dollar volume of their purchases of the
product in question.
Each case must be considered in the light of its peculiar circumstances
-e.g., geographical and time factors- in deciding whether or not customers
are competing.$
A prima facie violation of section 2(d) or 2(e) is not difficult to prove.
The plaintiff need only show that discrimination exists in promotional allow-
ances and/or in services or facilities from the defendant-supplier to a favored
5 Fisher, Sections 2(d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Babel Revisited, 11 VAND.
L. REv. 453, 467 (1958).
6 Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
7 For a full discussion of these constructions, see Fisher, supra note 5, at 466-82.
8 See Hickey, The Fred Meyer Case - Its Implications Under Section 2(d) of the Robin-
son-Patman Act, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 255, 260-70 (1964), for a general discussion of the three
concepts of "availability," "on proportionally equal terms," and "competing customers."
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customer among competing customers.9 These sections are called per se sections
and are to be contrasted with the more-difficult-to-prove section 2(a) violation.
This contrasting feature will be discussed further below. Once a prima facie
case has been made out against a supplier, his defenses seem to be limited to two:
first, that the allowance, service, or facility was, as a matter of fact, made avail-
able on proportionally equal terms to the competing customers; or secondly,
that the allowance, service, or facility, even though not made available on pro-
portionally equal terms, was made in the good faith meeting of competition
under the provisions of section 2(b)."
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) are generally enforced" by the FTC through
cease and desist orders.' 2 However, it is possible to bring about their enforce-
ment through a private suit for treble damages 3 or through a criminal action.'"
II. The Relationship of Section 2(d) to Section 2(a)
Section 2 (a)"5 is the general price discrimination provision of the Robinson-
Patman Act. It prohibits discrimination in price by a supplier "either directly
or indirectly" to various purchasers if such discrimination tends to have a harm-
ful effect on competition. A prima facie case tending to show a 2(a) violation
may be rebutted by showing that the price discrimination is justified by cost or
that it was made in the good faith meeting of competition.
Several observations might be made concerning the problems which arise
when section 2(a) is considered in relation to section 2(d).
There seems to be a legislative distinction between an indirect price dis-
crimination under 2 (a) and a discriminatory promotional allowance under 2 (d)
even though, from a common sense point of view, it would seem that a dis-
criminatory promotional allowance is a form of indirect price discrimination.
Perhaps the above distinction is one without a difference when there is only a
purported promotional allowance paid by a supplier to a customer where the
customer does no actual advertising or promoting of the supplier's product. Is
such a purported promotional allowance an indirect price discrimination under
2(a) or rather a 2(d) violation in the form of "payment .. .as compensation
or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through such
9 See Fisher, supra note 5, at 463: "[T]o establish a 2(d) or (e) violation, it is necessary
to show that services or allowances granted to one, or some, were not granted to all in com-
petition....
10 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964); BAuM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT,
58-59 (1964). Even though the language of section 2(b) does not seem to provide the good
faith meeting of competition defense for a section 2 (d) violation, it was held in Exquisite Form
Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499 (D.C.Cir. 1961), that the defense does apply to 2(d).
However, the cost justification defense and the defense of no probable harmful effect on com-
petition, available in a 2(a) action, do not apply to sections 2(d) and (e). FTC v. Simplicity
Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
11 Fisher, supra note 5, at 454-55 (1958).
12 Federal Trade Commission Act § 11, 38 STAT. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21
(1964). See, e.g., FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959); Corn Products Refining-
Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
13 Clayton Act § 4, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). See, e.g., Hartley &
Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1962); State Wholesale Grocer&
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1958).
14 Clayton Act § 14, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
15 49 Stat. 1526'(1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
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customer... ?" A literal reading of 2(d)'s "services or facilities furnished by
or through such customer" (emphasis added) would tend to support the propo-
sition that where no services or facilities are rendered by the customer in return
for the purported allowance there is no 2(d) violation but only a 2(a) violation.
Indeed, the Second Circuit in R. H. Macy & Co. v. FTC6 so stated:
"Admittedly, it might be difficult to read the language of Section 2(d) to
encompass a payment by a vendor to a buyer who did nothing but put the
money in his pocket; that would seem to be a Section 2(a) price discrimina-
tion." Even so, one writer points out that "the Commission [FTC] persists in the
view that it may opt between the strict requirements of Section 2(d) and those
of Section 2(a) where, in fact, no Services are performed."' 7
It is more difficult to prove a prima facie case under section 2(a) than
it is under 2(d) and, moreover, more and better defenses are available to
counter a 2(a) action than are available as defenses against a 2(d) charge.
Therefore it is not surprising that, if the Commission has a choice, it prefers
to bring an action under section 2(d) rather than under section 2(a). To
prove a prima facie 2(d) violation, the FTC, or the private plaintiff in a treble
damage suit, must show only that promotional allowances were granted to
some but not to all of the defendant-supplier's competing customers." The
only defenses which the supplier can raise are that the allowances were available
to all competing customers on proportionally equal terms or that the discrimina-
tory allowances were made in the good faith meeting of competition. On the
other hand, a section 2(a) violation is more difficult for the FTC, or any plain-
tiff, to prove since, in addition to showing a discrimination in price, it must
also show that,
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, de-
stroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of
either of them....
Moreover, in addition to a denial of price discrimination and/or harmful effect
on competition, a supplier-defendant has available as defenses, among others,
that the price discrimination was "cost justified" and/or that it was made in
the good faith meeting of competition. Thus, when and if the facts permit a
choice by the FTC or private plaintiff, to bring either a 2(a) or 2(d) action,
2(d) will be preferred.
The Commission's position that it may choose between the more stringent
requirements of 2(a) and those of section 2(d) where no services are performed,
probably stems from the general policy of the Robinson-Patman Act and from
the legislative history of section 2 (d) as discussed in American News Co. v. FTC. 9
There the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that though a pay-
ment is no more than a disguised price discrimination it can be prosecuted under
16 326 F.2d 445, 449 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum).
17 BAuM, op. cit. supra note 10, at 52.
18 Fisher, supra note 5, at 463.
19 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962).
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2(d) since the latter section was enacted for the purpose of eliminating "pro-
motional allowances which have the effect of price adjustments."20 Relatively
recent Commission decisions have, however, held that suit must be brought
under section 2(a) and not 2(d) where there is no promotional effort on the
part of the favored customer.2
One able commentator has interpreted the cases as drawing the line not
at whether or not promotional activity was actually performed by the favored
customer but rather at whether or not such activity is contemplated by the seller
when he makes the allowance.22 Thus, the test becomes a more difficult subjec-
tive one of intent than otherwise would be the case. This approach seems
highly impractical if not improper. It is a difficult or impossible task to deter-
mine exactly what is within the contemplation of a corporation -often the
supplier in question- which is made up of its stockholders, guided by its direc-
tors, and operated by its management. It is a difficult enough task to inquire
into the mental processes of an individual without attempting to create a fic-
titious corporate brain so that it may be examined to discover what is within
its contemplation.
This particular area- i.e., relationship between sections 2(a) and (d)
on the question of "purported" promotional allowances- is ripe for legislation,
as is the whole Robinson-Patman Act, but unless and until such legislation is
enacted, the best approach would appear to be to follow the literal language
of section 2(d), "any services furnished by or through such customer," (empha-
sis added) and to require that a quid pro quo be actually "furnished" before
section 2(d) can be invoked. Admittedly, this approach reaches the absurd
result that a supplier who exacts a return for his money, albeit discriminatorily,
is assaulted under a more stringent statutory provision - viz. 2(a) - than the
supplier who exacts nothing but who merely labels his discriminatory payment
a "promotional allowance." This, nonetheless, is the result the statute calls for
by its language and adherence to the statutory terminology is the only practical
way in which the courts can enforce the statute without launching a fruitless
effort to look toward the "intent" of a supplier.
III. The Other Side of the Coin- Buyer Inducement and/or Knowledgeable
Acceptance of Discriminatory Promotional Allowances,
Services or Facilities
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) are, by their terms, directed against the supplier
who discriminates among his customers by not making available to his com-
20 Id. at 108-09. See also P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 267 F.2d 439, 443 (3d Oir. 1959):
"The purpose of the section here involved [2(d)] was to eliminate all discriminations under the
guise of payments for advertising or promotional services ... "
21 E.g., Fred Meyer, No. 7492, FTC, March 29, 1963; Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co.,
No. 7718, FTC, Oct. 19, 1960.
22 RowE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 386 (Supp. 1964):
Although the thin line between a Section 2(d) promotional payment and a Sec-
tion 2(a) indirect price discrimination wavers, Section 2(d) comes into play only
where the seller contemplates some promotional quid pro quo for his money, and Sec-
tion 2(a) probably applies when the seller's "promotional" concession is an outright
grant with no expectation of promotional performance by the recipient.
SECTIONS 2(d) AND 2(e) OF THE ACT
peting customers advertising allowances and/or services or facilities on propor-
tionally equal terms. However, w1~at of the big buyer who induces or even,
perhaps, coerces this kind of discrimination? Are his activities sanctioned by
the Robinson-Patman Act?
Section 2(f) of the act states: "That it shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or
receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section."23  If viola-
tions of sections 2(d) and 2(e) are construed to constitute "discrimination in
price," as the legislative history of the act would seem to indicate, 24 then section
2 (f) applies to buyers who "knowingly" induce such violations.25 The FTC and
the courts,2 6 however, have not utilized section 2(f) in 2(d) and 2(e) situa-
tions. Rather they have proceeded against the buyer under another statute,
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act which prohibits generally "un-
fair methods of competition."2 The rationale of this approach is that Congress
inadvertently neglected to word section 2(f) to cover buyer inducement of
2(d) arid 2(e) violations, but that, since the spirit of the Robinson-Patman
Act has been violated by the buyer and since the act is directed against various
forms of price discrimination - a type of unfair competition - it is reasonable
to invoke the general prohibitions of section 5 of the FTC Act against him.
25
In opposition to this rationale it has been said that, by the use of section 5, the
Commission has "arrogate[d] to itself the legislative powers of Congress when-
ever there appears a field which Congress has not covered but which the Com-
mission believes should be covered by legislation of its own making."
29
The reasons which have prompted the Commission to proceed against
greedy buyers under section 5 rather than under section 2(f) are not entirely
clear. As mentioned, it is possible to construe section 2(f) to encompass any
form of "price" discrimination thereby including inducements of 2(d) and
2(e) violations. This would seem to be a more reasonable and rational approach
rather than resort to the general provisions of section 5 of the FTC Act. How-
ever, as noted above, this is not the course on which the law has proceeded.
23 49 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1964).
24 80 CONG. Rc. 9419 (1936). See RowE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 435-36: "[T]he
legislative history views promotional concessions as variants of the 'indirect' price discrimination
reprehended by the express provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act."
25 Rows, op. cit. supra note 2, at 432: "Although the FTC and the courts once adjudged
buyers' receipts of discriminatory promotional allowances under Section 2(f), a later viewpoint
spread that no promotional transactions were reachable under this provision."
For an opinion which assumes that section 2(f) applies, see Hartley & Parker, Inc. v.
Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916, 922 (5th Cir. 1962).
The Supreme Court expressly reserved this question in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC,
346 U.S. 61, 73, n. 14 (1953) : "We of course do not, in so reading § 2(f), purport to pass on
the question whether a 'discrimination in price' includes the prohibitions in such other sections
of the Act as §§ 2(d) and 2(e)."
26 FTC 1960 GuIDEs FOR SECTIONs 2(D) AND 2(E): "16.. . . [A] customer who knows
or has reason to know that he is receiving payment or service granted or furnished when the
seller violates Section 2(d) or '(e) may also be proceeded against by the Commission under Sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits unfair methods of competition."
See also, R. H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964); American News Co. v. FTC,
300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d. Cir. 1962).
27 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
45(a) (1964).
28 Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 96-98 (2d Cir. 1962).
29 Id. at 101 (Moore, J. dissenting).
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One writer has suggested a plausible reason for use of section 5 rather than
2(f). He states that the FTC has possibly taken a narrow view of 2(f)'s "dis-
crimination in price" so that it would not be put into a position of virtually
admitting "that price could relate to advertising allowances," or, in other words,
that discriminatory allowances, services, or facilities are really a form of price
discrimination, and, consequently, that the defenses of section 2(a) (no effect
on competition and cost justification) ought to be available to a supplier in a
2(d) or 2(e) action. 0
The confusion in this area could be remedied by the adoption of a replace-
ment for section 2(f) which was introduced in the House of Representatives
in 1961:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to receive, directly or indirectly, a price, pay-
ment, or allowance, service or facility prohibited by subsections (a), (d),
or (e) of this section where such person knows, should know, or has reason
to believe that such price, payment, allowance, service or facility is pro-
hibited by such subsections.' (Emphasis added.)
Unfortunately, however, section 2(f) remains unchanged.
IV. Conclusion
It has been stated that:
Sections 2(d) and (e) perhaps provide the best example to be found any-
where of the ineptitude of statutory draftsmanship. Almost every word
has been the subject of litigation, and yet the meaning of the words is still
not clear because it is impossible to determine the meaning of the construc-
tion of the words by the courts.32
Moreover not only are the terms of the sections themselves not clear, but the
relationship of those terms with the other sections of the act is also hazy. The
answer to the many interpretive problems of sections 2(d) and 2(e), and of
their related provisions, as discussed here, lie with Congress rather than with
the FTC or with the courts.
Thomas D. Ready
Editorial Associate
30 BAUM, op. cit. supra note 10, at 67.
31 H.R. 124, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(f) (1961). See PATMAN, A COMPLETE GuIDE TO
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 165 '(1963).
32 Fisher, supra note 5, at 467.
